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Mechanisms
Stuart Glennan
Butler University
Forthcoming in 2009 in the Oxford Handbook of Causation

1. Introduction
The term ‘mechanism’ is commonly used to refer to a variety of systems or
processes that produce phenomena in virtue of the arrangement and interaction of a
number of parts. The term was originally applied to products of human design like
watches or water wheels, but has, at least since the seventeenth century been used equally
to describe systems (like cells) or processes (like those that produce sunspots) that are of
natural origin (Dijksterhuis 1969).
Mechanism is undoubtedly a causal concept, in the sense that ordinary definitions
and philosophical analyses explicate the concept in terms of other causal concepts such as
production and interaction. Given this fact, many philosophers have supposed that
analyses of the concept of mechanism, while they might appeal to philosophical theories
about the nature of causation, could do little to inform such theories. On the other hand,
methods of causal inference and explanation appeal to mechanisms. Discovering a
mechanism is the gold standard for establishing and explaining causal connections. This
fact suggests that it might be possible to provide an analysis of causation that appeals to
mechanisms.
There have been a variety of attempts to explicate the concept of mechanism and
to deploy it in understanding causation and causal explanation. Salmon (1984) and Dowe
(2000) treat mechanisms as a nexus of continuous physical processes. Bechtel and
Richardson (1993), Glennan (1996) and Machamer, Darden and Craver (2000) treat
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mechanisms as systems of interacting parts. As the process approach is discussed
elsewhere (Chapter 10), I will focus on the mechanical systems approach, which for
brevity I shall refer to simply as the mechanical approach.
Glennan, who is the most explicit in trying to develop a mechanical account of
causation, characterizes mechanisms in this way:
A mechanism underlying a behavior is a complex system which produces that
behavior by the interaction of a number of parts according to direct causal laws
(Glennan 1996: 52).
Glennan then suggests that two events are causally related when and only when they are
connected by an intervening mechanism.
I will explore three issues surrounding the adequacy of the mechanical approach
to causation. First, I consider whether the appeal to laws or invariant generalizations in
characterizing interactions between parts of mechanisms either makes the mechanical
theory circular or reduces it to a regularity, counterfactual or manipulability theory.
Second, I discuss Machamer, Darden and Craver’s argument that the proper
understanding of the causal productivity of mechanisms requires the recognition of the
novel metaphysical category of activities. Third, I discuss the relationship between
mechanical theories and process theories.

2. Laws, Generalizations and Mechanisms:
Machamer, Darden and Craver (hereafter MDC) and Woodward (2002) have
raised concerns about Glennan’s use of laws to characterize interactions between parts of
mechanisms. According to one common understanding of scientific laws, laws must be
exceptionless regularities of unrestricted scope. If one understands laws in this way, it is
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implausible to assume that all interactions between parts of mechanisms are lawgoverned, because the regularities involved in the operation of mechanisms can be fragile
and subject to exceptions and breakdowns.
But this objection is largely an issue of terminology. Glennan explicitly adopts an
alternative usage which understands laws to comprise a large class non-accidental,
counterfactual supporting generalizations, many of them of restricted scope. 1 For
example, according to this usage Mendel’s law of independent assortment really is a law,
even though it is subject to exceptions (as when loci lie near to each other on the same
chromosome). While this usage has the virtue of stressing that the honorific ‘law’ is
applied to many generalizations of this character, Glennan has more recently (2002)
borrowed terminology from Woodward (2000), describing such generalizations as direct
invariant change-relating generalizations. These generalizations characterize interactions
in which changes in the properties of one or more parts bring about changes in a property
of another part. The requirement that these generalizations be direct dictates that the
change of properties in one part brings about the change in the properties of another part
without changing the properties of another part that is intermediate within a causal chain.2
Whatever one calls generalizations describing interactions between parts of
mechanisms, critics can argue that that these generalizations do all the causal work. A
mechanist must have some account of truth conditions for these generalizations, and the
suspicion is that any real insight into the nature of causation will lie in these conditions
rather than in the analysis of mechanisms. In particular, given the appeals that Glennan
(2002) and Craver (forthcoming) make to Woodward-style counterfactuals, one might
suspect that the mechanical account will reduce to a manipulability account.
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The mechanist can respond to this objection by appealing to the hierarchical
character of mechanisms. Mechanisms consist of parts whose direct interactions are
productive of some behavior, but what counts as a direct interaction depends upon the
level of analysis. In general, the parts of mechanisms are themselves mechanisms whose
behaviors depend upon the organization and interaction of the parts of those parts. So for
instance, one can explain the causal processes controlled by neuron circuits by invoking
direct interactions between neurons at synapses. But the mechanism of synaptic
transmission is itself a complex one, involving many constituent parts. These parts (e.g.,
vesicles, neurotransmitters, ions and ion channels) are themselves mechanisms composed
of parts whose interactions explain their behavior. Thus, one can see that the changerelating generalizations--in this case a generalization describing how one action potential
stimulates or inhibits another action potential--are explained by appeal to underlying
mechanisms. These generalizations are mechanically explicable (Glennan 1996: 61-63).
Thus, the fact that such generalizations are appealed to in characterizing a causal relation
does not undermine the mechanical character of the account.
The manipulability and mechanist accounts provide different criteria for
identifying causal connections. On the one hand, there is the manipulability criterion--in
this case, if one could manipulate the pre-synaptic neuron one would stimulate or inhibit
the post-synaptic neuron. On the other hand, there is the criterion of an identifiable
mechanism--in this case one has identified the mechanism of synaptic transmission. Is
there a reason to think that one criterion more genuinely captures the nature of the causal
relation?
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Proponents of the manipulability theory will immediately point to what appears to
be the Achilles heel of the mechanical account. Unless there is an infinite downward
chain of nested mechanisms, sooner or later one will run out of mechanisms. One reaches
a point where the parts of mechanisms interact in accordance with change relating
generalizations that are not mechanically explicable. To take a simple case, imagine a
Newtonian world in which two particles accelerate towards each other in virtue of their
gravitational attraction. This attraction is characterized by a change-relating
generalization describing the particles’ changes in velocity, but there is not (we’ll
suppose) a mechanism that explains this. It is just a brute fact that massive objects cause
other objects to accelerate toward them. Furthermore, the critic can make the following
sort of reductive argument: Because analysis of mechanically explicable generalizations
at higher levels will ultimately bottom out in mechanisms whose parts interact in nonmechanically-explicable ways, it will ultimately be the case that the causal character of
such generalizations depends upon on what can be called fundamental or mechanically
inexplicable generalizations. The virtue of the manipulability account is that it seems to
work even at the fundamental level. While, at the fundamental level I cannot find a
mechanism connecting X and Y, I can at least determine whether there is a causal
connection by seeing if I can wiggle X to wiggle Y. In light of this objection, the
manipulability theorist might argue that mechanists need manipulability but
manipulability theorists can live without mechanisms.
But the advantage of the manipulability theory is less than one supposes. At some
level the criticism of the mechanistic theory is that it cannot reductively eliminate causal
concepts. But, as Woodward (2003) takes pains to point out, neither can the
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manipulability theory. At the root of the manipulability analysis is the transparently
causal notion of an intervention. At the level of fundamental causal connections, how
does one know that one has wiggled X (and just X)? One can have some confidence that
one is wiggling X if one has an account of the wiggling mechanism, as well as an account
of what mechanisms are used to isolate X from other factors that might be causally
connected to Y. In the absence of such an account, the manipulability theorist has only the
observation that the wiggling of X was followed by the wiggling of Y and the supposition
that the wiggle of Y depended on that of X.
Minimally, the manipulability theorist has made an important point about the
epistemology of causation. It is frequently the case that one can establish with reasonable
certainty that a variable is causally relevant to another without knowing anything about
the mechanism by which the variables are connected. Experimental manipulations can
provide evidence that variables are connected, even in the absence of mechanical
knowledge of how they are connected. But this epistemologically important point does
not legitimate the manipulability theory as a metaphysical account of causation. To see
this, consider the truth conditions for the interventionist counterfactuals that underlie the
manipulability theory. Do these truth conditions depend on singular or general facts?
Woodward’s answer is clear. Although causal claims are often made at the type level, the
truth of these claims depends upon the truth of claims about individuals:
a claim such as ‘X is causally relevant to Y’ is a claim to the effect that changing
the value of X instantiated in particular individuals will change the value of Y
located in particular individuals(Woodward 2003: 40).
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So, to understand the truth conditions for type-level claims, we must understand the truth
conditions for the token claims. These truth conditions are specified in terms of
interventionist counterfactuals. If one were to intervene on (this instance of X to change
its value) one would change Y. But how are we to understand the truth conditions for
these counterfactuals? Suppose at some time t I flip a switch (e1) and a light goes on (e2).
As an epistemic matter, I establish that e1 caused e2 by manipulating the switch at other
times t’, but the truth of the causal claim at t does not depend upon the truth of
correlations at t’. It depends upon the singular counterfactual dependency at t.
Stathis Psillos (2004) has raised this concern about Woodward’s account, arguing
that Woodward has given evidence conditions for interventionist counterfactuals, but that
he hasn’t given truth conditions. Psillos suggests that the appropriate way to correct this
deficiency is to appeal to laws of nature. Although he does not spell out how this appeal
would work in detail, roughly it must be that the counterfactual dependency would be
true in virtue of the fact that the sequence of antecedent and consequent was a tokening of
a lawful generalization. To make this proposal work, one needs an account of laws of
nature, and Psillos endorses the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis (MRL) approach, in which laws are
taken to be generalizations that are theorems (or axioms) of a deductive system that
provides the best combination of simplicity and strength (Lewis 1973: 73).
In adopting this view, Psillos has just traded one problem for another. The MRL
account of laws is a Humean position that grounds the truth of laws in the totality of
particular facts in the actual world (cf. Chapter 7). If truth conditions for counterfactuals
are grounded in MRL laws, Psillos’ proposal does provide truth conditions for
counterfactuals that are grounded in epistemically accessible facts about the actual world,
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but then the facts upon which a singular counterfactual (like the fact that if I were to flip
the switch I would turn on the light) depends are facts not just about the particular
instance but about the whole class of particulars. Thus, it violates the principle that the
truth conditions for singular causal claims should be intrinsic, that whether a change of an
instance of X causes a change of an instance of Y should depend only upon the local facts
surrounding these instances. Thus Woodward should rightly reject Psillos’ attempt to
ground the truth of singularist interventionist counterfactuals in MRL laws.
Except in the case of fundamental laws, the mechanical theory of causation can
provide the truth conditions for interventionist counterfactuals that the manipulability
theory seems to lack. When causal relations are mechanically explicable, what makes it
the case that wiggling some X will produce the wiggling of some Y is that there is an
intervening mechanism between X and Y.3 Understanding the nature, structure and
functional organization of the parts that make up that mechanism will allow one to
determine the range of counterfactual circumstances under which the dependency
between X and Y would be maintained--roughly those circumstances in which the
mechanism will not break down.
Given that any variables connected by intervening mechanisms depend on
mechanically inexplicable causal connections, it does seem incumbent on the mechanical
theorist to say something how one can know that such connections obtain. The mechanist
supposes that causal connections are constituted by interactions between parts of
mechanisms, and that the interactions between parts of mechanisms may, on further
analysis, be constituted by nested mechanisms, but that ultimately one will bottom out
with parts that interact, but where these interactions aren’t mechanically explicable.
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Suppose that one observes that changes in one part are followed by changes in another
part--perhaps changes that occur without intervention or perhaps changes that one
believes to be caused by an intervention. How does one know that the changes in one part
really produce the changes in the other part? This is Hume’s problem reproduced at the
level of the most basic constituents of mechanisms. Following the MRL approach, one
might take the fundamental laws to be those change-relating generalizations that give us
the simplest and strongest account of the facts in the world. Neither the mechanist nor the
manipulability theorist needs to suggest that fitting within the strongest and simplest
account is what makes it true that these variables are causally connected, but the
mechanist can say that this is the best reason we have, at the fundamental level, to accept
certain generalizations as expressing causal relations.

3. Activities and Interactions
MDC’s (2000) analysis of mechanisms is distinguished by its introduction of the
concept of an activity. MDC characterize mechanisms as ‘entities and activities organized
such that they are productive of regular changes from start or set-up to finish or
termination conditions’ (Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000: 3). MDC claim that the
introduction of the term ‘activity’ reflects a crucial metaphysical innovation. They argue
for this claim by characterizing the debate over the nature of mechanisms in terms of a
dispute between three ontological stances. First there are the substantivalists (including
Bechtel and Richardson and Glennan) whose basic ontology is an ontology of entities.
‘Substantivalists confine their attention to entities and properties, believing it is possible
to reduce talk of activities to talk of properties and their transitions’ (MDC 2000: 4).
Second, there are process ontologists (notably Rescher (1996)), who ‘reify activities and
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attempt to reduce entities to processes’ (ibid). They describe their new third way as
‘dualist’, requiring both entities and activities as ontologically irreducible categories.
MDC appear to overstate the novelty of their position because they fail to
recognize the dualist character of the substantivalist account. Where MDC speak of
entities and activities, Bechtel, Richardson and Glennan speak of parts and interactions.
No account of a mechanism can get along talking about the entities alone, but for
Glennan and for Bechtel and Richardson this additional ingredient is provided by
interactions.
MDC argue that this language is insufficient:
[I]t is artificial and impoverished to describe mechanisms solely in terms of
entities, properties, interactions, inputs-outputs, and state changes over time.
Mechanisms do things. They are active and so ought to be described in terms of
the activities of their entities, not merely in terms of changes in their properties
(MDC, 5).
MDC equate interactions with state changes over time. What this suggests is that the real
target of their criticism is a Humean conception of interactions in which interactions are
characterized ‘merely in terms of changes in … properties.’ Their view is that
productivity cannot be reduced to mere change in properties. Given the manifold
problems with Humean approaches to causation, this is certainly a respectable position to
take, but neither Glennan nor Bechtel and Richardson adopt the Humean approach. If
activities can be productive, so can interactions.
Machamer (2004) and Bogen (2005) have recently offered more detailed defenses
of the metaphysical significance of activities. The crux of their defense is that activities
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provide a better and more natural approach to understanding productivity than do
interactions, because activities can help us understand productivity without appeal to
counterfactuals.
First consider how counterfactuals appear to give some understanding of the
productive character of interactions. When a change in one part of a mechanism produces
a change in another part of a mechanism, the claim that the first change produces rather
than just precedes the second change is (ignoring a lot of details) taken to be licensed by
whatever evidence one has for the counterfactual claim that if the first change had not
occurred, neither would have the second. The modal character of the productivity is
cashed out in terms of the counterfactual.
Bogen worries however that this analysis makes the truth of a causal claim
depend upon what would have happened in other circumstances--what he calls
counterfactual generality--rather than upon what actually does happen. At root, both
Bogen and Machamer are appealing to a well-known argument from Elizabeth
Anscombe:
If A comes from B, this does not imply that every A-like thing comes from some
B-like thing or set-up or that every B like thing or set-up has an A-like thing
coming from it; or that given B, A had to come from it, or that given A, there had
to be B for it to come from. Any of these may be true, but if any is, that will be an
additional fact, not comprised in A’s coming from B (Anscombe 1993: 92).
. Anscombe insists that the production of a particular B from a particular A is
independent of any actual or counterfactual regularity. Bogen and Machamer seem to
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think that activities capture the notion of productivity without reference to any such
regularities.
I will not dispute the claim that the productive continuity between cause and
effect is a fact about the actual world in the particular case. What I will dispute is that
Anscombe, Machamer or Bogen have adequately explained what this productivity is.
Anscombe writes ‘causality consists of the derivativeness of an effect from it s causes.
This is the core, the common feature, of causality in its various kinds. Effects derive
from, arise out of, come of, their causes’ (ibid). MDC echo this when they characterize
activities: ‘Activities are the producers of change. They are constitutive of the
transformations that yield new states of affairs or new products’ (MDC 2000: 4). But
these characterizations of activities and causes do little more than offer a set of synonyms
for ‘cause’. They hardly elucidate the concept of cause or production. Neither Anscombe
nor MDC would worry too much about this, because they believe that we acquire our
understanding of causation by starting with the understanding of particular activities-pushing, bending, hitting, etc. But while this is certainly true, to the extent that our
concept of cause does mean something, we must give some account of what it means in
general, and to provide a synonym for ‘cause’, like ‘produce’, is not to provide an
analysis. The virtue of the manipulability approach to causation is that it tells one
something quite general about causes--that they can be used, in an idealized way--to
manipulate effects. The virtue of the mechanical approach is again that it tells one
something quite general about causes--that causes and effects will generally be connected
by intervening mechanisms. Neither of these theories provides reductive analyses of
causation, but both say something non-trivial about the nature of causation.
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4. Mechanical Systems and Mechanical Processes
While the term ‘mechanism’ is currently most commonly associated with the
concept of mechanism identified with the work of Bechtel, Glennan, and Machamer,
Darden and Craver, the term ‘mechanism’ first entered into the contemporary discussion
of causation and explanation with the work of Salmon and Railton, and the ‘causalmechanical’ approach to explanation(Railton 1978; Salmon 1984). What distinguishes
the earlier Salmon/Railton approach from the more recent approach is that Salmon and
Railton conceive of mechanisms as a network of interacting processes, whereas the more
recent mechanists think of mechanisms as systems — organized collections of parts.
To help understand the difference between the approaches, consider paradigm
cases of each sort of mechanism. For a systems theorist a paradigm case might be a toilet,
while for the process theorist a paradigm case might be a baseball striking a window. The
toilet is a thing—a structured system consisting of parts (valves, levers, floats, etc.) that
interact in regular ways. A baseball striking a window involves a process which involves
a series of events (the pitch of the baseball, the hit, the collision with the window, etc.),
but we can’t think of this sequence of events as a thing. The operation of system
mechanisms give rise to processes (e.g., toilets flush), but these processes are, in virtue of
the stability of the mechanism, regular and repeatable.
By attending to the distinction between these two kinds of mechanisms, we can
see a significant limitation in the mechanical approach to causation proposed in Glennan
1996. The hope expressed in that paper was that any two causally connected events that
were not connected in virtue of a fundamental (i.e., mechanically inexplicable) law,
would be connected by the operation of an intervening mechanism. If mechanisms are
construed as systems as they are in the accounts of Glennan, Bechtel and MDC, it is
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evident that there are many true singular causal claims in which a cause is not connected
to its effect via the operation of a mechanism qua system. When the baseball breaks the
window, there is a causal process that leads from the pitch of the baseball to the breaking
of the window, but there is no mechanism qua system for window breaking.
Clearly one of the attractions of the process approach is that it appears to give an
account of causal connectedness for singular causal sequences. But, it does so at a cost.
As Hitchcock (1995) has argued, process theories appear unable to provide any intuitive
understanding of the explanatory relevance of causes for effects. Relatedly, a process
theory that identifies interactions in terms of exchange of conserved quantities does not
provide informative and explanatory accounts of the nature of interactions between parts
at higher levels of organization (Glennan 2002; Psillos 2004).
What appears to be required to provide a more adequate and general mechanistic
account of singular causal sequences is to describe causal processes in terms of the
interactions of parts, as is done in the systems approach, but to recognize that in many
singular causal chains, the parts are not organized in a stable system. Thus for instance,
one can conceive of the baseball sequence in terms of the interaction of a set of parts
(baseball, bat and window), but these parts are not arranged in any stable configuration.
Consequently, the next pitch won’t necessarily be hit, and if hit, it won’t likely travel on
exactly the same trajectory. But what one does know is that when bats hit balls in certain
ways (i.e., with certain velocities and spins) they alter trajectories in reliable ways that
can be described by ‘change-relating generalizations’. Thus we see the striking of a ball
in a certain way as explanatorily relevant for the changing of that ball’s velocity and
ultimately for the breaking of the window. The singularity of the causal sequence arises
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from the fact that the particular arrangement and state of the parts of the mechanism on a
given occasion are ephemeral, but the parts themselves and their behavioral dispositions
are robust. An account of such ‘ephemeral mechanisms’ is briefly suggested in Glennan
2002, but much work would be needed to show how such an approach could improve
upon existing accounts of singular causation.

5. Further Reading
For a general introduction to recent work on mechanism it is good to begin with
Glennan 1996 and MDC 2000. The former work is more focused on issues of causation,
while the latter discusses a range of topics, including models, explanation and discovery.
Bechtel and Richardson 1993 is a book-length treatment of approaches to discovering
mechanisms, especially in biological systems, but it anticipates much of the general
mechanistic approach developed over the last decade. It is helpful to contrast this view of
mechanism with the theory of causal processes discussed in chapter 10 of this volume.
Concerning activities, the reader might begin with Machamer’s (2004) defense.
Tabery 2004 argues that both MDCs activities and Glennan’s interactions are necessary
for a proper account of mechanisms. Psillos 2004 provides a useful analysis and critique
of activities as well as of Glennan’s approach, and seeks to provide an account of the
relationship between mechanistic and manipulationist and counterfactual accounts of
causation.
There has been considerable work done in recent years on developing a theory of
causal-mechanical explanation. In the 1980s and 1990s, the term ‘causal mechanical
explanation’ was chiefly applied to Salmon’s (1984) approach. Glennan 2002 contrasts
Salmon’s approach to one consistent with the systems approach to mechanism. Thagard

Mechanisms - 16

1999 provides a related account of mechanisms and mechanistic explanation in the
context of medical science. Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005 offers a general account of
mechanistic explanation, contrasting it with nomological approaches. Using case studies
from neuroscience, Craver forthcoming provides a comprehensive theory of mechanistic
explanation. Craver’s book also has substantial discussions of the relationship between
mechanisms, manipulability and causation and of the implications of the mechanistic
approach for reduction and problems of higher-level causation.

Notes
1

Advocates of this usage of the term ‘law’ include Cartwright (1999) and

Mitchell(1997).
2

The notion involved here is essentially the same as Woodward’s notion of a direct cause

(2003), in which direct causes are those causes which can bring about effects while
holding all other factors fixed. Directness is relativized to a particular decomposition of a
system into parts.
3

This view is not really at odds with Woodward’s, because the path diagrams Woodward

uses to represent causal structure are naturally interpreted as diagrams of mechanisms.
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